Different participation rights exist in companies with more than 2000 employees who do not work in the coal, steel and steel sectors. The corresponding law is named for the year in which it was passed (1976). Here, too, both parties are represented on an equal footing on the supervisory board, but the chairman, whose voice is decisive in the event of an impasse, is still a representative of the shareholders. Unlike the Coal, Iron and Steel Act, the president is not “balanced” by a neutral member, which means that shareholders can always outperform employees. Responsibilities differ significantly in the treatment of stakeholders, such as Z.B, employees, customers, suppliers and communities. In large German groups, participation statutes require that half of the supervisory board be elected by workers and trade unions and councils. In Japan, boards of directors traditionally did not include non-executive directors and placed the well-being of employees before the return of shareholders. In the United States, shareholders` priority is generally, at least when a decision has been made to sell or dismantle control of the company (Bagley and Page 1999). With respect to the measures, Gilbert`s assertion that the generally used measure of market structure, of market concentration, does not accurately reflect the nature or intensity of competition, can hardly be contradicted. However, progress has been made in this area, particularly in the application of market power measures such as the Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005) modified learning index, although these measures are limited. The strategy of using several competition criteria, such as those used by Geroski (1990) and Artes (2009), is also promising, with the idea that we want to look for solid results about them. Therefore, some studies suggest that strategic interaction influences innovative activities, and some suggest that this is not the case.
It is also difficult to know from these results whether the lack of common outcomes in the different sectors studied means that strategic interaction is more or less important in some sectors than in others, but if this is true, it would be interesting to know under what conditions their nature and importance lie. However, even in studies that suggest that competitive interaction is important, we have no idea how important it is to other factors. Indeed, Geroski (1991c) speculated that strategic rivalry could be secondary to the influence of factors such as technological possibilities, and Cockburn and Henderson (1994) suggest that, in addition to opportunity, heterogeneous business capabilities appear to be much greater. However, these comments do not suggest that we should end the impact of strategic interaction on innovation, but rather indicate that we need to devote more studies to this.